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Product Liability
by Franklin P. Brannen, Jr.*
This Article surveys developments in Georgia product liability law
between June 1, 2012 and May 31, 2013.1 The Article covers noteworthy cases decided during this period by the Georgia Court of Appeals, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the United
States district courts located in Georgia.
I.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

More than seven years ago, Georgia adopted the Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 2 standard for assessing the admissibility of
testimony from expert witnesses in civil actions.' While the Georgia
appellate courts have provided guidance regarding the application of the
Daubert standard in other types of lawsuits, there have been few
Daubert opinions from the Georgia appellate courts in product liability
cases.4 Without state appellate court guidance, practitioners and judges
must rely on decisions from the federal courts as persuasive authority.5

* Counsel in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (B.A.,
1992); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1996).
Member, State Bars of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida.
1. For an analysis of Georgia product liability law during the prior survey period, see
Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. & Jacob E. Daly, Product Liability, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 64 MERCER L. REV. 231 (2012).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. Ga. S. Bill § 7, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1(2005) (currently codified at O.C.G.A. 247-702 (2013)).
4. See, e.g., Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Grp., P.C., 285 Ga. 667, 681 S.E.2d 152
(2009) (applying Daubert standard in a medical malpractice action); Mays v. Ellis, 283 Ga.
App. 195, 641 S.E.2d 201 (2007) (same); Cotten v. Phillips, 280 Ga. App. 280, 633 S.E.2d
655 (2006) (same).
5. To interpret the application of Georgia's Daubert statute, courts may seek guidance
from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert,509 U.S. 579, General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999), and other federal court interpretations of these decisions. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(f).
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However, the following opinions offer recent guidance on Daubert issues
in product liability cases.
In L-3 Communications Ttan Corp. v. Patrick,6 a personal injury
lawsuit involving the alleged malfunction of a turnstile, the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that the Superior Court of Camden County abused
its discretion by denying a motion to exclude the testimony of the
plaintiff's expert regarding the maintenance and operation of the subject
turnstile.' The plaintiff, Patrick, contended that he was walking
through a turnstile at work when the bar of the turnstile reversed
direction and struck him in the head. The plaintiff brought suit
regarding the negligent maintenance of the turnstiles, and, in response
to a summary judgment motion filed by the defendants, Patrick provided
an affidavit in which he contended, as "an expert in the mechanics of
turnstiles and pawl assemblies," that the turnstile failed to operate
correctly because of inadequate lubrication.' The defendants moved to
exclude Patrick's expert opinion under section 24-9-67.1 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), contending that his opinion was
unreliable.' 0
After a hearing on this motion, the trial court ruled that the performance of the turnstile was such a technical issue that it required expert
testimony to explain the allegedly defective performance. The trial court
concluded that Patrick was qualified to offer the opinion and had
undertaken a reliable methodology to reach his opinion. Based on this
expert testimony from Patrick, the trial court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment."
The court of appeals reversed the denial of the motion to exclude the
testimony under Daubert while emphasizing that the trial court has
broad discretion with its decision to admit or exclude expert testimony." The court of appeals noted that an appellate court can only
reverse such decisions when a trial court abuses its discretion, and in
this instance, the trial court had abused that discretion.13

6. 317 Ga. App. 207, 729 S.E.2d 505 (2012).
7. Id. at 213-14, 729 S.E.2d at 510.
8. Id. at 208, 729 S.E.2d at 506.
9. O.C.G.A.§ 24-9-67.1(2010), recodified at O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702. O.C.G.A.§ 24-9-67.1
was recodified in identical form in O.C.GA. § 24-7-702, except for the addition of § 24-7702(g), which excludes administrative proceedings and worker's compensation hearings
from § 24-7-702's application.
10. L-3 Commc'ns Titan Corp., 317 Ga. App. at 208, 729 S.E.2d at 506.
11. Id. at 208, 729 S.E.2d at 506-07.
12. Id. at 208-09, 729 S.E.2d at 507.
13. Id. at 209, 729 S.E.2d at 507.
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In his affidavit, Patrick averred that the turnstile was difficult to turn
and required additional force to make it start moving, but once the
turnstile began to move, it quickly reached its stopping point and
rebounded swiftly into him. In contrast, at the hearing, Patrick did not
confirm that the turnstile ever reached its stopping point. He also could
not explain why the turnstile would be difficult to turn in one direction
but would quickly spin back toward him and cause his injury. In
addition, he testified that the turnstile never moved freely.1
The court of appeals held Patrick's methodology to be lacking for the
following reasons: (1) he never inspected the turnstile that injured him
or an exemplar turnstile; (2) no one else supported his theory that poor
lubrication would cause a turnstile to move slowly and then ricochet
backwards at a high rate of speed; (3) he failed to explain his methodology, which prevented any validation of his theory by review against
accepted standards or testing of the theory; (4) he failed to cite any
treatise or authority supporting his theory; and (5) he failed to test his
theory." The court of appeals held that the only support for Patrick's
opinions came from his own assertions." Because there was no other
support for his opinions, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court, resulting in the exclusion of Patrick's expert testimony and
a grant of summary judgment to the defendants." This decision is
significant because it marks the first time a Georgia appellate court
reversed a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony
under Georgia's Daubert statute.1 8
In Sands v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A.," the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia's denial of a motion to exclude testimony
under Daubert in a personal watercraft (PWC) product liability action.20
The plaintiff in Sands fell off the rear of the PWC and sustained injury
to her vaginal and anal cavities from the force of the propulsion nozzle
on the PWC. Before trial, the defendants challenged the admissibility of

14. Id. at 211, 729 S.E.2d at 508.
15. Id. at 212-13, 729 S.E.2d at 509-10.
16. Id. at 213, 729 S.E.2d at 510.
17. Id. at 213-14, 729 S.E.2d at 510.
18. Id. at 209, 729 S.E.2d at 507. The court of appeals noted that its prior decision in
Hamilton-King v. HNTB Georgia, Inc., 296 Ga. App. 864, 676 S.E.2d 287 (2009), in which
it had reversed the Superior Court of Glynn County's exclusion of expert testimony, was
subsequently reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court in HNTB Georgia,Inc. v. HamiltonKing, 287 Ga. 641, 697 S.E.2d 770 (2010). L-3 Commc'ns Titan Corp., 317 Ga. App. at 209
n.7, 729 S.E.2d at 507 n.7.
19. 513 F. App'x 847 (11th Cir. 2013).
20. Id. at 851-52.
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testimony from the plaintiff's expert witness, Michael Burleson, who had
been retained by the plaintiff to provide evidence of alternative designs
for the PWC. Specifically, the defendants argued that Burleson's opinion
was unreliable because there had been no testing of his alternative
designs, particularly testing to assess whether the proposed alternative
design created new safety hazards. The district court denied the
defendants' motion, in part because the court concluded that Burleson
had conducted sufficient testing of his proposed alternative design.'
At trial, the plaintiff presented Burleson's testimony regarding the
alternative seat-back design. Although the defendants offered testimony
from their expert that the plaintiff's alternative design created additional hazards, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the design defect
claim and awarded the plaintiff $3 million. On appeal, the defendants
contended that the district court should have excluded Burleson's
testimony under Daubert because Burleson did not adequately test his
alternative design. 22 The court of appeals confirmed that "one of the
factors used to evaluate the reliability of an expert opinion is whether
it can be and has been tested."23 However, Burleson had conducted
acceleration and operational testing.2" The court held that Burleson
"was not required to test his seat back under every conceivable condition
in order to rule out the possibility of additional safety hazards."2 5
Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to exclude the
testimony.26

II. NEGLIGENCE
Many product liability actions filed in Georgia involve multiple
defendants in the sales chain, often including the original manufacturer,
various distributors, and product sellers. For a used product, multiple
entities may have custody and control of the product and then resell the
product before it reaches the consumer. The level of custody and control
that a product seller exercises over a product directly impacts whether
a duty arises for that seller to discover latent defects. In the area of
automotive products, the Georgia appellate courts have outlined the
basic framework under which a duty may arise for a product seller:

21.

Id. at 849, 852.

22. Id. at 850-51.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 851.
Id.
Id. at 852.
Id.
See CHARLES R. ADAMS, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS

§

25:4 (2012-2013 ed.).
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Under Georgia law, an automobile retailer "generally has no duty to
disclose a latent product defect of which it had no knowledge" or to test
vehicles it purchases for resale for the purpose of discovering latent or
concealed defects. However, where the retailer makes such an inspection, it incurs a duty to conduct such inspection nonl-]negligently.'
A critical issue in many automotive product liability cases is whether the
dealer undertook an inspection of the vehicle that created a duty on the
part of the dealer to discover a latent defect.
In Wilcher v. Redding Swainsboro Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc.,2 9 the
Georgia Court of Appeals assessed the respective duties owed by two
automotive dealers: Dealer 1, who sold a van that had an allegedly
defective tire on an "as is" basis to another dealer, and Dealer 2, who
sold the van to a consumer.ao Two employees of Dealer 1 had examined
the van to determine its trade-in value and to assess its value for resale
to Dealer 2. An employee of Dealer 2 did a cursory walk-around and
test-drive of the van. The plaintiffs contended that these activities were
sufficient to put both dealers on notice that the van was equipped with
an incorrectly sized tire. The Superior Court of Lee County disagreed
and granted the dealers' summary judgment motions.3 1
The first issue the plaintiffs raised on appeal was that the mismatched
tire was a readily visible defect that Dealer 1 should have noticed in its
valuation inspection of the van. Dealer 1 countered that it owed no duty
to the plaintiffs because it was an intermediate seller rather than the
ultimate seller to the consumer. 2 The appellate court noted that
previous reported decisions by Georgia courts examined whether a
dealership that sold a vehicle to a consumer had a duty to disclose latent
defects, but none of these decisions involved a situation like the one
presented in this case, in which the dealer sold the vehicle to another
dealer and had no control over the future disposition of the vehicle.
The appellate court held that whether the dealer had undertaken a
sufficiently detailed inspection (which would have created a duty on the
part of the dealer) was not the critical issue for a remote dealer."
Instead, the analysis should focus on whether the relationship between

28. Wilcher v. Redding Swainsboro Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 563, 566,
743 S.E.2d 27,30 (2013) (misquoted in the original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Underwood
v. Select Tire, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 805, 811, 676 S.E.2d 262, 268 (2009)).
29. 321 Ga. App. 563, 743 S.E.2d 27.
30. Id. at 563-64, 743 S.E.2d at 28-29.
31. Id. at 565-66, 569, 743 S.E.2d at 30, 32.
32. Id. at 565, 743 S.E.2d at 30.
33. Id. at 566-67, 743 S.E.2d at 30.
34. Id. at 568-69, 570, 743 S.E.2d at 32.
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the dealer and the plaintiffs is sufficient to create a duty for the
dealer.35
Without reported Georgia decisions on this specific issue, the court of
appeals reviewed Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co.,36 a decision by the Ohio
Supreme Court about an allegedly defective lock ring on a wheel.37 In
that case, the dealer at issue had sold the truck to another dealer "as
is."" The Ohio court concluded that this dealer owed no duty to a
subsequent purchasing consumer because the dealer had sold the truck
with no representations regarding the condition of the truck and the
dealer had no control over its future disposition." Based on the
rationale in Thrash, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a remote
dealer who sells a vehicle "as is" to another dealer owes no duty to a
subsequent consumer purchaser to conduct any inspections of the vehicle
in a non-negligent manner.40 The court highlighted that there was no
evidence that the consumer relied on the remote dealer's inspection to
the consumer's detriment.
For Dealer 2 (the dealer who sold the van directly to the consumer),
the appellate court concluded that there was no evidence that the
dealer's "brief examination of the [vi an was conducted for the benefit of
a consumer or with the understanding that a consumer would rely upon
the results of his inspection."
The plaintiffs complained that such a
holding would create another element of proof for plaintiffs in negligent
inspection cases-plaintiffs would have to show that they both knew
about the inspection and relied on it.43 But the court of appeals
emphasized that this evidence of reliance was already a necessary
element in negligent inspection cases under Georgia law and this
decision did nothing to alter that framework." In addition, without the
element of reliance, dealers would not be able to sell vehicles on an "as
is" basis because any limited contact with the vehicle would be construed
as an inspection that triggered a duty on the part of the dealer."
Under that construct, dealers would have to perform full safety

35.
36.
37.
420).
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 569, 743 S.E.2d at 32.
110 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio 1953).
Wilcher, 321 Ga. App. at 567, 743 S.E.2d at 31 (reviewing Thrash, 110 N.E.2d at
Thrash, 110 N.E.2d at 423.
Id.
Wilcher, 321 Ga. App. at 569, 743 S.E.2d at 32.
Id.
Id. at 571, 743 S.E.2d at 33-34.
Id. at 572, 743 S.E.2d at 34.
Id. (citing Underwood, 296 Ga. App. at 812, 676 S.E.2d at 269).
Id. at 573, 743 S.E.2d at 34.
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inspections of all vehicles that came within their possession irrespective
of whether the vehicles were being sold to consumers or being sold for
scrap parts, which would unnecessarily increase transaction costs for
consumers.4
III.

A.

DEFENSES

Preemption

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution4 7 provides
that federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land .. . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."'
Thus, state laws that conflict with federal law are "without effect "0
A state law conflicts with a federal law "if it interferes with the methods
by which the federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal," even if
both the federal law and the state law have the same goal." Although
preemption issues are typically analyzed in connection with a federal
statute, a federal regulation may have the same preemptive effect as a
federal statute." State laws subject to preemption include not only
state statutes and regulations, but also tort duties imposed by state
common law and enforced by lawsuits."
"The critical question in any [preemption] analysis is always whether
Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law."" In
fact, Congress's purpose in enacting the federal law is the "ultimate
touchstone" of the preemption analysis. Congress may manifest its
intent to preempt state law "by express language in a congressional
enactment [namely, express preemption], by implication from the depth

46. Id. at 573, 743 S.E.2d at 34-35.
47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
48. Id.
49. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
50. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987).
51. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (holding that "a federal
agency acting within the scope of its congressionally[-]delegated authority may [preempt]
state regulation"); see also Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154
(1982) (noting that a "narrow focus on Congress'[s] intent to supersede state law [is]
misdirected" when a state law is claimed to be preempted by a federal agency's regulation).
52. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993); Cipollone v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992); see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's
Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy.").
53. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 369.
54. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
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and breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field
[namely, field preemption], or by implication because of a conflict with
a congressional enactment [namely, implied or conflict preemption]."
Although Congress's purpose is important, there is a presumption that
Congress did not intend to preempt state law, especially when it "has
legislated . .. in a field [that] the [sitates have traditionally occupied."56
Because "the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and
historically, a matter of local concern," state law regulating these
matters is preempted only if Congress's intent to do so is "clear and
manifest."" Thus, when faced with two or more plausible interpretations of a federal law, the presumption against preemption imposes on
courts "a duty to accept the reading that disfavors [preemption]."so
During the survey period, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia decided Cline v. Advanced Neuromodulation
Systems, Inc.,so a medical device case involving an interpretation of the
Premarket Approval (PMA) process under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (MDA).61
Under the PMA process, manufacturers of Class III devices must submit
an extensive application that includes effectiveness and safety data,
design and manufacturing specifications, and a sample of the product
labeling." As part of this thorough regulatory scheme, the MDA in 21
U.S.C. § 360k 63 contains an express preemption provision that states:
[N]o [state or political subdivision of a [sitate may establish or
continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement-(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and

55. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citations omitted).
56. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985).
58. Id. at 715 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1976). See also
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 ("[W~e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the [sitates were not to be superseded by the [flederal [a]ct unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.").
59. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
60. 914 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
61. Id. at 1294-95; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k (2012).
62. Cline, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1294-95.
63. 21 U.S.C. § 360k.
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(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
this chapter."
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 65 the United States Supreme Court
established a test to assess whether a state-law claim is preempted by
§ 360k and concluded that preemption occurs when a claim seeks to
impose requirements that are "different from, or in addition to," the
"detailed federal oversight" involved in PMA.66 Neither the United
States Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
decided whether § 360k preempts an express warranty claim.67
To assess this issue, the court in Cline first found that the limited
warranty, which accompanied the medical device, affirmed that the
product would be free of defects in material and workmanship for one
year and created an express warranty under Georgia law."
The
manufacturer argued that this warranty was preempted by the MDA
because the warranty language was part of the labeling information that
was subject to the rigorous regulatory scheme." Without any binding
precedent on the issue, the court applied the Riegel test and readily
concluded that the MDA provides requirements issued by the federal
government.o For the second prong of Riegel, the court found a split
in the persuasive authority regarding whether the breach of express
warranty claim imposed obligations different from, or in addition to, the
federally imposed requirements.'
The court found persuasive a test
under which the MDA would preempt breach of express warranty claims
based on language in the express warranty that relates to the safety or
effectiveness of the medical device.7 2 Applying this analysis, the court
concluded that the free-from-defects-for-a-year language did not overlap
with the safety and effectiveness analysis undertaken by the Food and
Drug Administration as part of PMA. 73 Accordingly, the court held
that the breach of express warranty claim was not preempted by the
MDA.74

64. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
65. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 316 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)).
Cline, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1298.
Id.
Id. at 1300.
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Statute of Limitations

Under Georgia law, personal injury lawsuits must be filed within two
years after the right of action accrues." In product liability actions,
this limitations period applies whether the claims arise under warranty
or tort law." For continuing torts, Georgia courts apply a discovery
rule under which "[a] cause of action will not accrue ... until the
plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered not only that he has been injured but also that his injury may
have been caused by the defendant's conduct."77 A tort is deemed to be
continuing "where any negligent or tortious act is of a continuing nature
and produces injury in varying degrees over a period of time."0
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
considered the applicability of the discovery rule in Wheeler v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp., a. pharmaceutical product liability lawsuit
involving Zometa, a medication typically prescribed for patients with
bone cancer.o The plaintiff's wife was diagnosed with breast cancer
that had metastasized to her spine. As part of a treatment regimen, her
oncologist, Dr. Keaton, prescribed Zometa to reduce complications related
to the bone cancer. Dr. Keaton testified that when he prescribed Zometa
he discussed the risks and benefits of the medication, including the risk
of osteonecrosis of the jaw (ONJ). Almost two years later, in July and
September of 2009, the plaintiff's wife developed ONJ and was told by
both her dentist and her oral surgeon that there was a correlation
between her use of Zometa and her ONJ. In October 2009, the plaintiff's
wife discontinued Zometa, and Dr. Keaton noted in the medical records
that Zometa could complicate her ONJ.ex
The plaintiff filed this lawsuit in December of 2011 for damages
arising from his wife's use of Zometa. The defendant pharmaceutical

75. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (2007).
76. Adair v. Baker Bros., Inc., 185 Ga. App. 807, 808, 366 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1998); see
also Daniel v. Am. Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 168, 304 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1983) (determining there is no "reason to differentiate between actions for personal injuries brought under
a theory of strict liability as opposed to negligence").
77. King v. Seitzingers, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 318, 319-20, 287 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1981)
(quoting Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170, 174 (N.H. 1977)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
78. Everhart v. Rich's, Inc., 229 Ga. 798, 802, 194 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1972); see also
M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs., 172 F.3d 797, 804-05 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Bitterman v.
Emory Univ., 175 Ga. App. 348, 348, 333 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1985)) (applying Georgia law).
79. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70636 (S.D. Ga. May 15, 2013).
80. Id. at *1, *12-15.
81. Id. at *5-8.
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company moved for summary judgment contending that the plaintiff's
claims were barred by the two-year statute of repose." Because the
plaintiff's wife used Zometa on multiple occasions, the district court
treated the alleged injury as a continuing tort." The court examined
the record and found that by October 2009, the plaintiff's wife should
have reasonably been aware of the connection between Zometa and ONJ
when Dr. Keaton reported that Zometa could aggravate her ONJ."
Because this event took place more than two years before the plaintiff
filed the lawsuit, the plaintiff's claims were barred by the two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury claims."

82. Id. at *8, *11.
83. Id. at *14.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *14-15. Although the plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium was not barred
by the statute of limitations (because the limitations period for loss of consortium claims
is four years), the court dismissed the loss of consortium claim because there was
insufficient evidence to support the underlying claims of strict liability, negligent
manufacture, and negligent failure to warn. Id. at *15-*19.

